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INTRODUCTION
This Essay addresses the dilemmas of mercy lawyers, defenders
of prisoners and death row inmates in post-conviction clemency
proceedings. Framed by the moral tension between retribution and
redemption, the dilemmas arise at trials in the clash of opening claims
of innocence and penalty phase pleas of mitigating forgiveness, and at
commutation hearings in dissonant confessions of guilt and
declarations of atonement. To better understand these moral and
strategic dilemmas, the Essay examines the recent literature of
clemency and the accumulated writings of four academics
distinguished in the field of criminal law and capital punishment:
Stephen Garvey, Austin Sarat, Jonathan Simon, and Robert
Weisberg.1
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Ethics and Public Service, University of
Miami School of Law. A.B., 1981, Brown University; J.D., 1984, Columbia University
School of Law. I am grateful to Adrian Barker, Troy Elder, Michael Fischl, Clark
Freshman, Steve Garvey, Ellen Grant, Patrick Gudridge, Amelia Hope, Dennis Lynch,
Cynthia McKenzie, Janet Reno, Harriet Roberts, Austin Sarat, Jonathan Simon, Karen
Throckmorton, Frank Valdes, Laura Walker, and Robert Weisberg for their comments
and support. I also wish to thank Wendy Blasius, Claudine Rigaud, and the University of
Miami School of Law library staff for their research assistance, as well as the editors of the
North Carolina Law Review for their commitment to the scholarship of mercy. This Essay
is dedicated to Rose Marie Rocha Alfieri, an aunt of remembered kindness.
1. See generally Stephen P. Garvey, Is It Wrong To Commute Death Row?
Retribution, Atonement, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1319 (2004) (exploring the concept of
mercy within the theories of retributive punishment and punishment as atonement);
Austin Sarat, Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: Victims, Retribution, and George
Ryan's Clemency, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1345 (2004) (addressing victims' rights claims and the
retributive theory of punishment); Jonathan Simon, Fearless Speech in the Killing State:
The Power of Capital Crime Victim Speech, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1377(2004) (analyzing the role
of capital crime victims' speech); Robert Weisberg, Apology, Legislation, and Mercy, 82
N.C. L. REV. 1415 (2004) (examining the idea of mercy in the context of the Death
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Cast against the backdrop of my own writings on the race-
conscious ethics of prosecutors and defenders within the criminal
justice system,2 this examination situates clemency advocacy in the
context of sociolegal violence3 and criminal defense practice.4  My
Penalty Reform Act in Illinois).
2. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Community Prosecutors, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1465
(2002) (evaluating the role of community prosecution in illuminating and positively
transforming the tension between the criminal justice system and race); Anthony V.
Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1995) (parsing the defense of
those charged with beating Reginald Denny during the 1992 riots in South Central Los
Angeles to address the larger dynamics revealed in cases of black-on-white racially motivated
violence); Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized Defenses, 95
MICH. L. REV. 1063 (1997) (utilizing the trials of the Alabama Ku Klux Klan for the 1981
lynching of Michael McDonald to assess the representation of defendants in cases of white-on-
black racially motivated violence); Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Race, 48 DUKE L.J. 1157
(1999) (studying the role of race in the prosecution of the New York police officers charged
with the assault of Abner Louima, a Haitian immigrant); Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting
Violence/Reconstructing Community, 52 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2000) (contemplating the role of
community in prosecutions for the sexual assault of the Central Park jogger and for the
murder of James Byrd in Jasper, Texas); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Prosecutors, Race
Defenders, 89 GEO. L.J. 2227 (2001) (exploring the role of community based race-conscious
modes of prosecution and defense in healing racial tensions within the criminal justice
system); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1293 (1998) (considering race in the
context of the trials of Lemrick Nelson and Charles Price for their roles in four days of race-
motivated violence in New York City in 1991); Anthony V. Alfieri, Retrying Race, 101 MICH.
L. REV. 1141 (2003) (reviewing prosecutorial discretion in the revival of cases involving white-
on-black racially motivated violence during the 1950s and 60s).
3. Broadly defined, sociolegal violence spans private, public, and state forums.
Examples include domestic abuse, hate crimes, and capital punishment. See generally THE
KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE (Austin
Sarat ed., 1999) [hereinafter THE KILLING STATE] (exploring, through an anthology, the
impact of the death penalty on American politics, legal values, and culture); AUSTIN
SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN
CONDITION (2001) (surveying the political and cultural consequences of living in a society
which allows state killing as criminal punishment); Jonathan Simon, Review Essay, Why
Do You Think They Call It Capital Punishment? Reading the Killing State, 36 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 783 (2002) (reviewing WHEN THE STATE KILLS and exploring its place within
sociolegal scholarship on the death penalty). Additional examples, such as lynching, cross
categorical boundaries. Sociolegal violence encompasses material as well as narrative
forms of violence. See generally LAW'S VIOLENCE (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns
eds., 1992) (collection of essays pondering the relationship between violence and the law);
LAW, VIOLENCE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE (Austin Sarat ed., 2001) (exploring,
through an anthology, the interaction of violence and the law); PAIN, DEATH, AND THE
LAW (Austin Sarat ed., 2001) (collecting essays); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty
Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991) (articulating
the importance for poverty lawyers of the empowerment of their clients' narratives); Donald
L. Beschle, What's Guilt (or Deterrence) Got to Do With It?: The Death Penalty, Ritual,
and Mimetic Violence, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 487 (1997) (analyzing the death penalty
as a phenomenon not meant to fulfill goals of retribution or deterrence, but to serve as a
source of unity within the communities in which it is practiced, and exploring theories of
capital punishment as mimetic violence).
4. The American tradition of criminal defense practice is embodied in the adversary
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purpose is to describe and prescribe the defender role of the
clemency advocate in cases of private violence, especially violence
motivated by race and racism in their various forms.' Part I of the
Essay briefly surveys the history and structure of clemency,
highlighting the actions of former Illinois Governor George Ryan in
pardoning and commuting the sentences of 167 prisoners and death
row inmates in January 2003. Part II explores traditional and
alternative models of criminal defense advocacy germane to attaining
clemency. Part III integrates the analytic methods and enlarges the
normative prescriptions of Garvey, Sarat, Simon, and Weisberg into a
faith-inspired abolitionist model of clemency advocacy for mercy
lawyers.
I. CLEMENCY
Properly located, this abridged study of mercy lawyers forms part
of a larger body of interdisciplinary research and scholarship on
criminal justice norms.6 The study treats the seeking of clemency as a
model of zealous advocacy. See generally, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH,
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS § 2, § 4 (2d ed. 2002) (providing an overview of the
adversarial system and the duty of zealous representation); Charles Curtis, The Ethics of
Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 3 (1951) (emphasizing the lawyer's duty of client loyalty);
David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1755-60 (1993)
(upholding the criminal defense norm of zealous advocacy).
5. Recent work on the prosecution and defense of racial violence incites academic
quarrel. See, e.g., Robin D. Barnes, Interracial Violence and Racialized Narratives:
Discovering the Road Less Traveled, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 788, 788-91 (1996) (rejecting
arguments in Alfieri's Defending Racialized Violence critiquing criminal defense strategies
in cases involving racially motivated violence); Richard Delgado, Making Pets: Social
Workers, "Problem Groups," and the Role of the SPCA-Getting a Little More Precise
About Racialized Narratives, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1571, 1571-72 (1999) (endorsing studies of
the "rhetorical meaning of race" in civil and criminal contexts); Christopher Slobogin,
Race-Based Defenses: The Insights of Traditional Analysis, 54 ARK. L. REV. 739, 739-49
(2002) (critiquing restriction on criminal defense lawyers' use of racialized narratives in
defense of their clients); Abbe Smith, Burdening the Least of Us: "Race-Conscious" Ethics
in Criminal Defense, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1585, 1585-91 (1999) (critiquing race conscious
conceptions of progressive criminal defense lawyering). See also Alex J. Hurder, The
Pursuit of Justice: New Directions in Scholarship About the Practice of Law, 52 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 167, 185-86 (2002) (acknowledging the importance of critical clinical scholarship
for prosecutors and defense lawyers).
6. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path
of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477 (1997) (arguing that deterrence theory can best be
understood by imagining law as a representation of shared values); Dan M. Kahan,
Privatizing Criminal Law: Strategies for Private Norm Enforcement in the Inner City, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1859 (1999) (arguing for private sector participation in the regulation of
social norms in criminal law); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and
Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997) (showing how economic analysis of crime fails to
consider the role of social influence in the individual's decision to commit crimes); Dan M.
Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609
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basic element of the post-conviction review process essential to the
jurisprudential legitimacy of capital punishment.7 It defines clemency
broadly to include commutations and pardons.8
Prior work in this area documents the injustice of state systems
regulating trials and post-conviction appeals in capital cases.9 The
work cites evidence of procedural irregularity and substantive
(1998) (stating that economic analysis of crime should consider social norms); Dan M.
Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 805 (1998) (discussing the potential role of social norms in the
discouragement of crime); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of
Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996) (discussing the role of emotion
in criminal law).
7. See generally CATHLEEN BURNETT, JUSTICE DENIED: CLEMENCY APPEALS IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES (2002) (exposing pervasive flaws in death penalty convictions);
RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 838-44 (2d ed. 2001) (reviewing the rationales and procedures behind executive
clemency); SAMUEL P. STAFFORD II, CLEMENCY: LEGAL AUTHORITY, PROCEDURE
AND STRUCTURE (1977) (reviewing the clemency rules and procedures of the fifty states);
Daniel T. Kobil, The Evolving Role of Clemency in Capital Cases, in AMERICA'S
EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 531-546 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2002)
(assessing the development of the clemency power and judicial interpretations of its
function); Michael L. Radelet & Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-
Furman Capital Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 289 (1993) (compiling cases where clemency
was granted); Alyson Dinsmore, Comment, Clemency in Capital Cases: The Need to
Ensure Meaningful Review, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1825 (2002) (arguing that clemency
requires procedural safeguards in order to be effective).
8. See generally Symposium, Clemency and Pardons, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 177 (1993)
(discussing clemency and pardons); Symposium, Forgiveness & The Law: Executive
Clemency and the American System of Justice, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 139 (2003) (discussing
the role of executive clemency in the criminal justice system); Symposium, The Law and
Politics of the Death Penalty: Abolition, Moratorium, or Reform?, 81 OR. L. REV. 1 (2002)
(discussing differing ways of mitigating the death penalty). See also Norman L. Greene,
Panel Presentation, Clemency and the Capital Offender: An Introduction to the Power and
the Punishment, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 557, 564 (2000) (giving a brief review of the history of
pardons and the shift in attitude of organized religion); Michael Heise, Mercy by the
Numbers: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency and Its Structure, 89 VA. L. REV. 239, 264-
68 (2003) (using statistical analysis to consider the factors which affect the decision to
grant clemency).
9. See James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030,
2047-51 (2000) (considering the relationship between substantive capital review and
clemency); Judge Stephen Reinhardt, The Supreme Court, The Death Penalty, and the
Harris Case, 102 YALE L.J. 205, 221 (1992) (arguing that last-minute claims that raise
substantial issues of innocence or constitutional violation should be handled fairly and
expeditiously by the federal courts); Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, and
Responsibility in Capital Trials: The View from the Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 1103, 1113-117
(1995) (discussing the jury's central role in exercising the people's power to decide
between life and death in capital cases); Ronald J. Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The
Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 797, 799-848 (1986) (discussing each stage of a death penalty case and
the inequities that occur).
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inequality attributed to racial bias 0 and exacerbated by unchecked
prosecutorial discretion." The evidence continues to incite public
debate both here and abroad. l The increasing federalization of the
criminal law 3 and the expanding congressional ratification of the
death penalty14 amplify this chorus of national and international
10. See generally DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: RACE AND CLASS IN
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1999) (discussing the role that both race and class play in
the administration of the criminal justice system); Mari A. DeWees et al., Race, the Death
Penalty, and Wrongful Convictions, 18 CRIM. JUST. 49 (2003) (addressing the issue of
racial discrimination in the criminal justice system); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Black Man's
Burden: Race and the Death Penalty in America, 81 OR. L. REV. 15 (2002) (presenting the
problems confronting African Americans in the criminal justice system with specific
emphasis on the death penalty); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., REP. NO. GGD 90-57, DEATH
PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATITERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5
(1990), reprinted in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES
268-74 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 1997) [hereinafter CURRENT CONTROVERSIES]
(summarizing studies examining the influence of race on capital sentencing procedures).
11. See generally Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., Permeation of Race, National Origin and
Gender Issues From Initial Law Enforcement Contact Through Sentencing: The Need for
Sensitivity, Equalitarianism and Vigilance in the Criminal Justice System, 31 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1153 (1994) (examining the role of race, gender, and national origin in the criminal
justice system from contact with law enforcement officials to sentencing); Yoav Sapir,
Neither Intent Nor Impact: A Critique of the Racially Based Selective Prosecution
Jurisprudence and a Reform Proposal, 19 HARV. BLACKLET-rER L.J. 127 (2003)
(examining racially based selective prosecutions and equal protection challenges); Lori
Montgomery, Steele Seeks New Study of Death Penalty Cases: Ehrlich's Point Man Fears
Racial Bias, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2003, at C1 (discussing the finding of bias against blacks
in prosecutions and the role of the governor and lieutenant governor).
12. See STEPHEN P. GARVEY, BEYOND REPAIR?: AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 2
(2003). See generally William J. Bowers et. al., A New Look at Public Opinion on Capital
Punishment: What Citizens and Legislators Prefer, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 77 (1994)
(presenting a review of public opinion on capital punishment from the viewpoints of both
citizens and legislators); Nora V. Demleitner, The Death Penalty in the United States:
Following the European Lead?, 81 OR. L. REV. 131 (2002) (discussing the discrepancy in
stances on the death penalty between Western Europe and the United States); Austin
Sarat & Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth Amendment:
Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 WiS. L. REV. 171 (1976) (discussing the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment with reference to the death
penalty); Michelle M. Sharoni, A Journey of Two Countries: A Comparative Study of the
Death Penalty in Israel and South Africa, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 257 (2001)
(comparing the diversity of opinion over the use of the death penalty in South Africa and
Israel); Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, 81 OR. L.
REV. 97 (2002) (reviewing the use of the death penalty in the United States and its
implications).
13. See JAMES A. STRAZZELLA, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW: TASK
FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION 5-17 (1998); Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The
Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 652-75 (1997); Symposium,
Federalization of Crime: The Roles of the Federal and State Governments in the Criminal
Justice System, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 965, 965-1251 (1995); Symposium, Rethinking Federal
Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 1-271 (1997).
14. See generally Rory K. Little, The Future of the Federal Death Penalty, 26 OHIO
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discord.
Similar procedural and substantive controversy infects executive
clemency in capital cases.15 The source of state executive clemency
power is grounded in statutory authority encoded in Illinois and
elsewhere. 6 Public controversy over the scope of that authority
exploded in the aftermath of the recent, highly charged Illinois
clemency hearings. 7 Commencing in October 2002, the two-week
hearings involved scores of inmates and horrific stories of private
violence. They convened in the wake of a series of widely publicized
state inmate exonerations.18  The exonerations prompted close
scrutiny of the tainted history of the Illinois death penalty. That
history revealed recurrent cases of ineffective counsel, 9 sentencing
disparity,2° and, most disturbing, outright innocence.21 Those findings
N.U. L. REV. 529 (2000) (discussing the uncertain future of the death penalty).
15. See Norman L. Greene, The Context of Executive Clemency: Reflections on the
Literature of Capital Punishment, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 513, 523-54 (2000) (reflecting on the
literature concerning the death penalty and the role of executive clemency); George H.
Ryan, The Role of the Executive in Administering the Death Penalty, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
1077, 1084-85.
16. ILL. CONST. art. V, § 12; 730; ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/3-3-13 (West 1997 &
Supp. 2002).
17. See Lee Hockstader, Dead Men Walking; When a Scandal-Plagued Governor
Cleared Out Illinois' Death Row, He Wasn't Worried About His Political Future. He
Already Knew He Didn't Have One, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2003, at W24; Steve Mills et al.,
Life-or-Death Debate Rages at Hearings: Attorneys Argue Over Clemency as Victims'
Families Relive Grief, Pain, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 16, 2002, § 1, at 1; Victims Protest Chance
Clemency, NEWSDAY, Oct. 17, 2002, at A19.
18. See Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions, Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, Illinois Death
Penalty Exonerations, at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/
deathpenalty.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
19. See Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Inept Defenses Cloud Verdicts, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 15, 1999, § 1, at 1.
20. See Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Region, and Death Sentencing in
Illinois, 1988-1997, 81 OR. L. REV. 39, 67-68 (2002).
21. See Bryn Nelson, Setting Innocent Free, NEWSDAY, Jan. 26, 2003, at A07; Ctr. on
Wrongful Convictions, Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, Executions of Possibly Innocent
Prisoners (June 2, 2003), at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/
executingtheinnocent.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also Stanley
Z. Fisher, Convictions of Innocent Persons in Massachusetts: An Overview, 12 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 1, 12-56 (2002) (providing detailed case studies of convictions of innocent
persons in Massachusetts); Stephen P. Garvey, Death-Innocence and the Law of Habeas
Corpus, 56 ALB. L. REV. 225, 249-53 (1992) (pursuing a conception of death-innocence in
capital cases); Eli Paul Mazur, "I'm Innocent": Addressing Freestanding Claims of Actual
Innocence in State and Federal Courts, 25 N.C. CENT. L.J. 197, 219-26 (2003) (describing
difficulties in obtaining habeas relief for claims of actual innocence); Henry Pietrkowski,
The Diffusion of Due Process in Capital Cases of Actual Innocence After Herrera, 70 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1391, 1393-401 (1995) (discussing restrictions on habeas relief for
innocence claims); Michael L. Radelet et al., Prisoners Released from Death Rows Since
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spurred Governor Ryan to create a Commission on Capital
Punishment to review the historical prosecution and sentencing of
capital cases in Illinois.22 The gravity of the Commission's April 2002
report eventually compelled Ryan to issue an executive order
granting a mix of 167 commutations23 and pardons24 for both capital
and non-capital offenses.25  Decreed on January 12, 2003, the
clemency order provoked far-reaching public outcry26 as well as
prosecutorial and legislative challenges to the exercise of state
executive clemency power. 27 The furor engulfed Illinois, 28 a battery of
sister states,29 Europe,3 and ultimately even Latin America.31 At the
1970 Because of Doubts About Their Guilt, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 907, 916-22 (1996)
(examining cases in which innocent defendants were put to death).
22. See COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1 (2002), at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/
commissionjreport/index.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Executive
Order as Issued by Former Governor George Ryan, Creating the Commission on Capital
Punishment, at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ ccp/executiveorder.html (last visited Feb.
18, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also David Horan, The
Innocence Commission: An Independent Review Board for Wrongful Convictions, 20 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 91, 98 (2000) (discussing the preliminary stages of the Illinois
Commission).
23. See Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Clemency for All; Ryan Commutes 164 Death
Sentences to Life in Prison Without Parole; "There Is No Honorable Way to Kill," He Says,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 2003, § 1, at 1; Jodi Wilgoren, Citing Issues of Fairness, Governor
Clears Out Death Row in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,2003, at Al.
24. See Jodi Wilgoren, 4 Death Row Inmates Are Pardoned, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11,
2003, at A13.
25. See Christi Parsons & Steve Mills, Ryan Pardons Don't Stop at Death Row: 150
Got Clemency for Other Offenses, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 26, 2003, § 1, at 1.
26. See David Firestone, Absolutely, Positively for Capital Punishment, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 2003, § 4, at 5; Gregory Kane, Commutation of Ill. Killers Not Justice for Victims'
Kin, BALT. SUN, Jan. 19, 2003, at 1B; Eric Slater, Sentenced to a Life of Mourning: The
Family of a Woman Murdered for Her Fetus Can't Understand How the Governor of
Illinois Could Have Emptied Death Row, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2003, §1, at 1; George F.
Will, Editorial, Ryan's Fiat: The Outgoing Governor of Illinois Defied the Will of the
People, PITT. POST-GAZETrE, Jan. 20, 2003, at All.
27. See Alexa Aguilar, Bill Would Set Process for Granting Clemency: Lawmaker
Wants Each Case Reviewed, Followed by a Public Recommendation: Governor Would
Retain Power, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 17, 2003, at B1; Effort to Void Death-Row
Clemencies Continues, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 18, 2003, at 4A; Christi Parsons &
Karen Mellen, House Bill Seeks Limit on Blanket Clemency, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 17, 2003, § 1,
at 1.
28. See Molly McDonough, The National Pulse: Outgoing Illinois Gov. George
Ryan's Commutation of 171 Death Sentences Reverberates Throughout the State Legal
System: Balance of Power: Prosecutors Challenge Historic Commutation of 171 Death
Sentences, 2 ABA J. E-REPORT 1 (2003).
29. See Maura Dolan, Echoes of Illinois on Death Row: California System Shares
Traits with One So Flawed That the State's Governor Commuted All Sentences, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2003, § 2, at 1 (reporting suspected weaknesses in California's capital
punishment system); Bill Murphy, Death Row: Status Quo: Texas Undeterred by Illinois'
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same time, it sparked a broad ecumenical movement, supported by
many in the clergy, to abolish the death penalty in Illinois.3 2
Despite earlier uproar over the executive clemency power
wielded during the Clinton Administration,33 at present surprisingly
muted debate surrounds the constitutional and statutory
underpinnings of executive clemency on federal or state levels.
Current commentary tends to dwell on the justifications' and
Ripple Effects, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 19, 2003, at 1A (noting that Texas law precludes
commutation of death sentences or pardon by the governor); Howard Pankratz, Salazar
Defends State Death Penalty: AG Says Use is 'Prudent,' DENV. POST, Jan. 23, 2003, at 3B
(reporting that the Colorado Attorney General's defense of the death penalty is based on
a four-step process required in all capital cases); Daniel Ruth, Florida Strives to Regain the
Title in Death Row Follies, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 29, 2003, at 2 (discussing Florida's
proliferation of death row inmates whose sentences were later commuted due to extrinsic
evidence of innocence).
30. See Peter Finn, Foreign Leaders Laud Move on Death Penalty in Illinois, WASH.
POST., Jan. 18, 2003, at A19 (noting the hope of foreign leaders that Governor Ryan's
actions would prompt debate on the death penalty in America); Barry James, Clearing of
Illinois Death Row is Greeted by Cheers Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2003, at A10
(reporting near unanimous support for Governor Ryan's decision in legal communities
overseas).
31. See Duncan Campbell, Mexico to Challenge US Use of Death Penalty, GUARDIAN
(London), Jan. 22, 2003, at 13 (reporting Mexico's quest to free fifty-one Mexican citizens
on death row in America who were refused assistance of consulates by the U.S.); Hugh
Dellios, Mexico Asks UN to Spare 51 in U.S.: World Court Told Nationals Illegally on
Death Row, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 22, 2003, § I at 1 (same).
32. See Julia Lieblich, Clergy Leaders Stand with Ryan on Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 31, 2003, § 2, at 6 (citing the approval of Governor Ryan's exercise of clemency by
world religious leaders such as Pope John Paul II and Archbishop Desmond Tutu).
33. See Michael A. Genovese & Kristine Almquist, The Pardon Power Under Clinton:
Tested but Intact, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE LAW: THE CLINTON LEGACY 75-88
(David Gray Adler & Michael A. Genovese eds., 2002) (defining the extent of the
presidential pardon power and critiquing President Clinton's use of that power); see also
Deborah A. Devaney, A Voice for Victims: What Prosecutors Can Add to the Clemency
Process, 13 FED. SENT. R. 163, 163 (2001) (urging prosecutor participation in the clemency
process); David M. Zlotnick, Reflections on the Clinton Pardons: Federal Prosecutors and
the Clemency Power, 13 FED. SENT. R. 168, 168 (2001) (noting the debate following the
Clinton pardons). See generally Margaret Colgate Love, The Pardon Paradox: Lessons of
Clinton's Last Pardons, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 185 (2003) (discussing the pardons President
Clinton granted on the last day of his term in office to draw lessons about how the
executive pardon process should function in the American constitutional framework).
34. See generally Bruce Ledewitz & Scott Staples, The Role of Executive Clemency in
Modern Death Penalty Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 227 (1993) (proposing justifications for
commutation, including to correct error at trial or to respond to circumstances that have
developed since trial); Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, 27
U. RICH. L. REV. 281 (1993) (examining reasons used to justify pardons historically and
arguing that clemency must be justified by "good and sufficient reason" to be a valid
exercise of the pardoning power); Neal Walker, Commission Report, Executive Clemency
and the Death Penalty, in Amnesty International, USA, Commission Report: Death
Penalty on Trial, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 266 (1994) (addressing various reasons given for
commutations such as mental illness, disability, or doubts about guilt).
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limitations3 5 of executive clemency. The moral claims of retribution3 6
and mercy 37 stand central to this inquiry. Retribution has long served
as the moral bulwark for capital punishment schemes. Yet, in recent
decades, mercy has gained progressively more vocal adherents in
ameliorating and rationalizing those schemes and has thereby
advanced the criminal justice process toward a more redemptive
posture."
Multiple factors impinge on the resolution of the competing
moral claims specific to capital punishment. Of these, contextual and
interpretive considerations weigh heavily. Both erect impediments to
a redemptive clemency process. Contextual impediments stem from
the constraints posed by the populist politics of the electoral process39
35. See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 561, 609-40 (2001); James N. Jorgensen, Note, Federal Executive Clemency Power:
The President's Prerogative to Escape Accountability, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 345, 367-70
(1993). See generally Mark Strasser, Some Reflections on the President's Pardon Power, 31
CAP. U. L. REV. 143, 153-58 (2003) (discussing limitations on presidential pardon power
and concluding that the costs of imposing more limitations would be far greater than
benefits gained).
36. See Hugo Adam Bedau, A Retributive Theory of the Pardoning Power?, 27 U.
RICH. L. REV. 185, 189-90 (1993); Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribution and Redemption in the
Operation of Executive Clemency, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1501, 1509-19 (2000); Mark
Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power on Pardons, Retributivists, and the United
States Constitution, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 85, 89-100 (2002). See generally Richard 0.
Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital
Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177 (1981) (analyzing retribution and deterrence as moral
bases for the death penalty); Julian Davis Mortenson, Earning the Right to Be Retributive:
Execution Methods, Culpability Theory, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 88
IOWA L. REV. 1099 (2003) (discussing gratuitous infliction of pain as a challenge to the
moral integrity of capital punishment).
37. See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 181 (1989); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND
MERCY 162-74 (1988); Kathleen M. Ridolfi, Not Just an Act of Mercy: The Demise of
Post-Conviction Relief and a Rightful Claim to Clemency, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 43, 77-81 (1998).
38. See P.E. Digeser, Justice, Forgiveness, Mercy, and Forgetting: The Complex
Meaning of Executive Pardoning, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 161, 169-73 (2003); Daniel T. Kobil,
The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 569, 611-14 (1991); Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics and Collar Buttons:
Reflections on the President's Duty to Be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483, 1500-06
(2000). See generally Paul Whitlock Cobb, Jr., Note, Reviving Mercy in the Structure of
Capital Punishment, 99 YALE L.J. 389 (1989) (arguing that mercy must play a central role
in the capital punishment system).
39. See Jeffrey D. Kubik & John R. Moran, Lethal Elections: Gubernatorial Politics
and the Timing of Executions, 46 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3-7 (2003); Jonathan Simon & Malcolm
M. Feeley, True Crime: The New Penology and Public Discourse on Crime, in
PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SHELDON L. MESSINGER
147-80 (Thomas G. Blomberg & Stanley Cohen eds., 1995). See generally Beau Breslin &
John J.P. Howley, Defending the Politics of Clemency, 81 OR. L. REV. 231 (2002)
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and the inflammatory customs of the media.4" They also involve the
institutional constraints of police4 1 and prosecutorial misconduct,42
and the systemic juridical deficiencies caused by ineffective assistance
of counsel,43 inadequate funding of state indigent defense systems,44
(adhering to the position that politics is, and should remain, a necessary component of the
clemency decision); Stephen P. Garvey, Note, Politicizing Who Dies, 101 YALE L.J. 187
(1991) (discussing the risks of vesting death selection in institutions that are politically-
electorally accountable).
40. See generally George Lardner, The Role of the Press in the Clemency Process, 31
CAP. U. L. REV. 179 (2003) (explaining the importance of "watchdog journalism" in
monitoring the exercise of pardon power); Austin Sarat, The Cultural Life of Capital
Punishment: Responsibility and Representation in Dead Man Walking and Last Dance, 11
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 153 (1999) (determining that death penalty films support the
conceptual foundations of capital punishment and legitimate its place in the American
penal system); Austin Sarat & Aaron Schuster, To See or Not to See: Television, Capital
Punishment, and Law's Violence, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 397 (1995) (suggesting that
televising executions would unsettle the law's attempt to dignify the death penalty and
expose the sadism that is at the heart of the state's attachment to capital punishment).
41. See Thomas P. Sullivan, Three Police Station Reforms to Prevent Convicting the
Innocent, 17-APR CBA REC. 30 (2003).
42. See Welsh White, Curbing Prosecutorial Misconduct in Capital Cases: Imposing
Prohibitions on Improper Penalty Trial Arguments, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1147, 1147-50,
1184 (2002); Brian C. Duffy, Note, Barring Foul Blows: An Argument for a Per Se
Reversible-Error Rule for Prosecutors' Use of Religious Arguments in the Sentencing Phase
of Capital Cases, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1335, 1339-59 (1997); Ashley Rupp, Note, Death
Penalty Prosecutorial Charging Decisions and County Budgetary Restrictions: Is the Death
Penalty Arbitrarily Applied Based on County Funding?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2735, 2738
(2003).
43. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1837 (1994); Stephen B.
Bright, In Defense of Life: Enforcing the Bill of Rights on Behalf of Poor, Minority and
Disadvantaged Persons Facing the Death Penalty, 57 MO. L. REV. 849, 859 (1992); William
S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of
the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 91, 93 (1995); Bruce A. Green,
Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433,
433 (1993); Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to
Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363, 364 (1993); Joe Margulies,
Resource Deprivation and the Right to Counsel, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 673, 676
(1989); Celestine Richards McConville, The Right to Effective Assistance of Capital
Postconviction Counsel: Constitutional Implications of Statutory Grants of Capital
Counsel, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 31, 32 (2003); Ivan K. Fong, Note, Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel in Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 461, 485 (1987); see also Panel
Discussion, The Death of Fairness? Counsel Competency and Due Process in Death
Penalty Cases, 31 Hous. L. REV. 1105 (1994) (comparing the O.J. Simpson defense team
to the common public defender system).
44. See Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal
Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. OF AM.
LAW 783, 783 (1997); Ruth E. Friedman & Bryan A. Stevenson, Solving Alabama's
Capital Defense Problems: It's a Dollars and Sense Thing, 44 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1992);
Norman Lefstein, Reform of Defense Representation in Capital Cases: The Indiana
Experience and Its Implications for the Nation, 29 IND. L. REV. 495, 496 (1996); Michael G.
Millman, Financing the Right to Counsel in Capital Cases, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 383, 384
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judge-made error,45 jury failure,46 and cultural bias in the criminal
justice system common to race and gender.47
Interpretive impediments also thwart a redemptive clemency
process. They relate to the contested construction and uneven
implementation of sentencing guidelines48 and procedures49 under
federal regulations50 and state statutes." The difficulty of textual
construction in parsing capital statutes and clemency regulations on a
(1985); Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, The Unconscionability of Sub-
Minimum Wages Paid Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 281, 342
(1991).
45. See John H. Blume & Stephen P. Garvey, Harmless Error in Federal Habeas
Corpus After Brecht v. Abrahamson, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 176-82 (1993).
46. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Deadly Paradox of Capital Jurors, 74 S. CAL.
L. REV. 371, 395 (2001); Theodore Eisenberg et. al, Forecasting Life and Death: Juror
Race, Religion, and Attitude Toward the Death Penalty, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 308-10
(2001); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility in Capital Sentencing: An Empirical
Study, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 339, 352-68 (1996); Stephen P. Garvey et al., Correcting Deadly
Confusion: Responding to Jury Inquiries in Capital Cases, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 627, 635-
36 (2000); Stephen P. Garvey & Paul Marcus, Virginia's Capital Jurors, 44 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2063, 2083-85 (2003).
47. See VIVIEN M.L. MILLER, CRIME, SEXUAL VIOLENCE, AND CLEMENCY:
FLORIDA'S PARDON BOARD AND PENAL SYSTEM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 215-16
(2000); David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-
Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1710-15 (1998); Stephen B. Bright, Race, Poverty, the Death
Penalty, and the Responsibility of the Legal Profession, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 73,
78 (2002); Victor L. Streib, Gendering the Death Penalty: Countering Sex Bias in a
Masculine Sanctuary, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 433, 434 (2002).
48. See Paula K. Birderman & John R. Steer, Impact of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines on the President's Power to Commute Sentences, 13 FED. SENT. R. 154, 154
(2001); Daniel T. Kobil, Should Clemency Decisions be Subject to a Reasons Requirement?,
13 FED. SENT. R. 150, 150 (2001).
49. See Clifford Dorne & Kenneth Gewerth, Mercy in a Climate of Retributive Justice:
Interpretations from a National Survey of Executive Clemency Procedures, 25 NEW ENG. J.
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 413, 427-38 (1999); Daniel T. Kobil, Due Process in Death
Penalty Commutations: Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Clemency, 27 U. RICH. L. REV.
201,202 (1993).
50. See 28 C.F.R. § 1.1-1.11 (2003); United States Attorney's Manual §§ 1-2.110-.113
(1997) (Sup. Docs. No. J1.8:At84/2/997/v.1, http://www.usdoj.gov/pardon/petitions.htm
(last visited Feb. 18, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
51. See John H. Blume, Twenty-Five Years of Death: A Report of the Cornell Death
Penalty Project on the "Modern" Era of Capital Punishment in South Carolina, 54 S.C. L.
REV. 285, 309-15 (2002); Marshall J. Hartman & Stephen L. Richards, The Illinois Death
Penalty: What Went Wrong?, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 409, 437-39 (2001); Illinois
Prisoner Review Board: Guidelines for Executive Clemency,
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/clemency.htm (last visited Feb. 18,
2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also Daniel T. Kobil, Do the
Paperwork or Die: Clemency, Ohio Style?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 655, 677, 682-95 (1991)
(examining checks on clemency power); Walter A. McFarlane, The Clemency Process in
Virginia, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 241, 255-56 (1993) (offering practical guidance in clemency
petitions).
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case-by-case basis is compounded by doctrinal instability, 2 for
example in engrafting criminal law categories of insanity and mental
retardation upon capital cases.53 As a result of these intertwining
impediments, mercy lawyers struggle to marshal the redemptive
norms embedded in the institutions and texts of clemency.
II. CLEMENCY ADVOCACY
Clemency advocacy derives from the adversarial tradition of
zealous criminal defense practice.54 That tradition rests on the
foundational norms of partisanship and moral non-accountability.
Applied to capital punishment, these twin norms produce trial
strategies based primarily on claims of innocence, justification, and
mitigation. By design, neither the innocence phase nor the penalty
phase of bifurcated capital trials emphasizes the redemptive norms of
either contrition and remorse or penitence and atonement. Post-
conviction review practices adopt the same conception and
stratagem.56 Prescribed standards of care, even when appropriately
heightened, operate similarly.57 Indeed, American Bar Association
defense guidelines scarcely mention redemptive norms and
52. See Carol S. Steiker, Things Fall Apart, but the Center Holds: The Supreme Court
and the Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475, 1489-91 (2002).
53. See Bryan Lester Dupler, The Uncommon Law: Insanity, Executions, and
Oklahoma Criminal Procedure, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 63-65 (2002); James W. Ellis, Mental
Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legislative Issues, 27 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 11, 11-12 (2003); Lyndsey M. Sloan, Comment, Evolving
Standards of Decency: The Evolution of a National Consensus Granting the Mentally
Retarded Sanctuary, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 351, 372-73, 379-81 (2003).
54. See Cristina C. Arguedas, Duties of a Criminal Defense Lawyer, 30 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 7, 7-8, 11-12 (1996); Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: The Case for Unmitigated
Zeal on Behalf of People Who Do Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 925, 958-59
(2000); Michael E. Tigar, Defending, 74 TEX. L. REV. 101, 102-03 (1995).
55. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 7, 50-66
(1988).
56. See CATHLEEN BURNETT, JUSTICE DENIED: CLEMENCY APPEALS IN DEATH
PENALTY CASES 117-23 (2002); DAVID T. WASSERMAN, A SWORD FOR THE
CONVICTED: REPRESENTING INDIGENT DEFENDANTS ON APPEAL 229-33 (1990); John
Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and Case
Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465, 466-70 (1999); Michael Mello, "In
the Years When Murder Wore the Mask of Law": Diary of a Capital Appeals Lawyer
(1983-1986), 24 VT. L. REV. 583, 677-84 (2000).
57. See Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in
Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245, 249-51 (1990-1991); Gary
Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 360-62 (1983); Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 360-65, 368-74
(1993).
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narratives.58
The call for redemptive forgiveness and mercy is inhibited by the
standard conception of the criminal defense function.
Notwithstanding important commitments to lawyer competence and
diligence coupled with pledges of client loyalty and confidentiality,
standard conventions naturally favor acquittal and plea bargaining
tactics over risk-taking gambits involving capital defendants' guilt-
disclosing, individualized redemptive pleas. 9 Devised by statute,
capital sentencing allows for limited moral individualization through
the admission of aggravating and mitigating evidence.' However, the
moral individualization of clemency advocacy goes beyond standard
defense practices of sentencing mitigation.61 Rather than summoning
evidence from social psychology62 or science, 63 clemency-tailored
58. See American Bar Association: Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance
of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 924-31 (2003). See
generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND
PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, Guidelines 11.4, 11.6.1, 11.8.6
(1989) (providing instructions on the investigation relating to the guilt/innocence phase of
the trial followed by possible plea bargaining and use of mitigating factors in the case of
conviction).
59. See Douglas M. Cohen & Esther F. Lardent, The Last Best Hope: Representing
Death Row Inmates, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 213 (1989; Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not to
Plead: Effective Assistance and Client-Centered Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841, 907-08
(1998).
60. See Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do
Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1544-50 (1998); Scott W. Howe, Reassessing the
Individualization Mandate in Capital Sentencing: Darrow's Defense of Leopold and Leob,
79 IOWA L. REV. 989, 1068-71 (1994); Jonathan Simon & Christina Spaulding, Tokens of
Our Esteem: Aggravating Factors in the Era of Deregulated Death Penalties, in THE
KILLING STATE, supra note 3.
61. See A.L. STUBBS, CLEMENCY, THE FUTURE OF THE DEATH PENALTY: THE
ACTION HANDBOOK FOR ABOLITIONISTS & ACTIVISTS (1999) (advocating strategic
planning initiatives for death penalty abolitionists, which can be used to "plan ideological
campaigns for abolition and clemency"); Larry Myers, An Appeal for Clemency: The Case
of Harold Lamont Otey, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, supra note 10, at 361-83
(detailing the appeals process endured by one capital defendant and his ultimate execution
by the State of Nebraska).
62. See generally Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories
and the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547 (1995) (discussing the legal,
moral, and psychological significance that attaches to a capital defendant's life and their
impact upon the punishment decision); David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
the Criminal Courts, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 279 (1993) (discussing the effect of
therapeutic jurisprudence on sex offenders and the plea process, and the conditional
release process); Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 184 (1997) (discussing the rise of therapeutic jurisprudence
and its impact as an interdisciplinary approach to the study of law).
63. See generally Anna M. Franceschelli, Comment, Motions for Postconviction DNA
Testing: Determining the Standards of Proof Necessary in Granting Requests, 31 CAP. U.
L. REV. 243 (2003) (detailing the legal issues involved in post-conviction DNA testing and
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moral individualization demands a faith-based proffer of defendant
religious awakening, enlightenment, and devotion. That proffer
springs from client-lawyer theological collaboration in fashioning an
authentic religious predicate for a faith-infused claim of clemency.64
Clothed in frequently derided narratives,65 the claim invites a state-
mediated redemptive dialogue of contrition and atonement between
the inmate and the victim, the latter typically in the guise of a
surviving family.66
Strands of deepened client-lawyer collaboration and
reconfigured moral dialogue may be gleaned from feminist revisions
of criminal defense practice,67 most notably in the representation of
battered women.6 s The reevaluation of client-lawyer hierarchy,69
the need for standards in such testing to protect inmates); Holly Schaffter, Note,
Postconviction DNA Evidence: A 500 Pound Gorilla in State Courts, 50 DRAKE L. REV.
695 (2002) (tracing the history and modern-day use of forensic DNA evidence in the post-
conviction process).
64. See generally Gary J. Simson & Stephen P. Garvey, Knockin' on Heaven's Door:
Rethinking the Role of Religion in Death Penalty Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1090 (2001)
(arguing that if the First Amendment Religion Clauses were strictly construed, religion
would play a much more limited role in capital cases).
65. See generally Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353 (1996) (describing "the role that narrative plays in the work
of lawyers who devote their professional lives ... to opposing capital punishment");
Austin Sarat, Speaking of Death: Narratives of Violence in Capital Trials, 27 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 19 (1993) (addressing how legal violence is differentiated from extralegal
violence in capital trials).
66. See generally Theodore Eisenberg et al., Victim Characteristics and Victim Impact
Evidence in South Carolina Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 306 (2003) (discussing the
influence of victim impact evidence on the course and outcome of capital trials using
interviews conducted with South Carolina jurors); Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain
from Heaven": Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989 (1996) (advocating
a restructuring of the penalty phase to "incorporate and accommodate mercy"); Stephen
P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 26 (2000)
(exploring the emotional distance between a defendant and a juror in a capital case and its
impact upon the likelihood of a death sentence); Daryl M. Schumacher, Comment,
Intruders at the Death House: Limiting Third-Party Intervention in Executive Clemency, 30
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 567 (1997) (discussing the need for standing in executive clemency
petitions due to the changes which flow from "allowing improper third parties access to
the executive clemency forum"); Brian L. Vander Pol, Note, Relevance and Reconciliation:
A Proposal Regarding the Admissibility of Mercy Opinions in Capital Sentencing, 88 IOWA
L. REV. 707 (2003) (arguing that the use of victim impact evidence inflames the jury in a
capital case).
67. See Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes to Law School: The Clinical Education of the
Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 15-45 (1993).
68. See generally PATRICIA GAGNE, BA'ITERED WOMEN'S JUSTICE: THE
MOVEMENT FOR CLEMENCY AND THE POLITICS OF SELF-DEFENSE (1998) (tracing the
history of the battered women's clemency movement); Linda L. Ammons, Why Do You
Do the Things You Do? Clemency for Battered Incarcerated Women, a Decade's Review,
11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 533 (2003); Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of
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gender discourse,70 and moral agency71 in defending crimes of
violence effectively transformed advocacy narratives and outcomes
for women's advocates. A comparable transformation of professional
hierarchy, racial discourse, and agency narratives animates the
representation of subordinated communities of color,72  thus
demanding new lawyer competencies and client-lawyer
relationships.73
III. TOWARD FAITH-BASED CLEMENCY ADVOCACY
The faith-imbued model of clemency advocacy contemplated
Counsel for Battered Women Defendants: A Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 217 (2003) (citing battered women's history in discounting clemency as a cure for
domestic violence); Mary E. Greenwald & Mary-Ellen Manning, When Mercy Seasons
Justice: Commutation for Battered Women Who Kill, 38 B.B.J. 3 (1994) (describing the
commutation process of the criminal justice system and its effect in focusing public
attention on the victims of domestic violence); Joan H. Krause, Of Merciful Justice and
Justified Mercy: Commuting the Sentences of Battered Women Who Kill, 46 FLA. L. REV.
699 (1994) (documenting the history of granting clemency to battered women who kill
their batterers); Jacqueline St. Joan & Nancy Ehrenreich, Putting Theory into Practice: A
Battered Women's Clemency Clinic, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 171 (2001) (describing the
clemency movement for battered women in light of a clinical course where law students
petitioned the governor of Colorado "for clemency on behalf of three women who had
been convicted of homicide in the deaths of their batterers").
69. See Peggy C. Davis, Contextual Legal Criticism: A Demonstration Exploring
Hierarchy and 'Feminine' Style, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1635, 1645-82 (1991); Kimberly E.
O'Leary, Creating Partnerships: Using Feminist Techniques to Enhance the Attorney-
Client Relationship, 16 LEGAL STUD. F. 207, 212-22 (1992); Ann Shalleck, Theory and
Experience in Constructing the Relationship Between Lawyer and Client: Representing
Women Who Have Been Abused, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1019, 1027-39 (1997); see also Bryna
Bogoch, Gendered Lawyering: Difference and Dominance in Lawyer-Client Interaction, 31
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 677, 681 (1997) (tracking gender and language differences in lawyer-
client interaction).
70. See Joan W. Howarth, Executing White Masculinities: Learning from Karla Faye
Tucker, 81 OR. L. REV. 183,184-85 (2002); Elizabeth Rapaport, Staying Alive: Executive
Clemency, Equal Protection, and the Politics of Gender in Women's Capital Cases, 4 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 967,967-68 (2001).
71. See Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women's Lives, Violence,
and Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 59, 61-62 (Martha
Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994).
72. See Lisa A. Crooms, "To Establish My Legitimate Name Inside the Consciousness
of Strangers": Critical Race Praxis, Progressive Women-of-Color Theorizing, and Human
Rights, 46 HOw. L.J. 229, 234, 236 (2003); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race
Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV.
821,828 (1997).
73. See GERALD P. LOPEz, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VIEW OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 38 (1992); Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-
Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 33, 35 (2001); Michelle S. Jacobs,
People From the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-Centered Counseling, 27
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345, 348-49 (1997).
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here reconceives lawyer identity and professional ethics in a religious
and, moreover, race-conscious sense. 74  Historically, abolitionist
norms informed both lawyer identity and ethics in clemency
advocacy.75  An extension of these norms, faith-based advocacy
envisions the clemency process as a religious forum for lawyer
engagement and client revival.76 Communicating that vision demands
narrative and story. Admittedly, narrative alone will not correct
institutional bias or cure ineffective assistance. But narratives may
bear witness to, and protest the injustice of, state killing.77
Lamentably, their echo may be muted by a criminal justice culture
marked by mistrust and punitiveness.78 Yet, this very culture harbors
community.79 Significantly, the bonds of redemptive community may
be strengthened by the killing state itself in heightening the standards
of death-making legislation, confessing error, and proffering
apology.80
Faith narratives encourage religious community from the culture
74. See David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, and Professional
Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REV. 1502, 1506-07 (1998).
75. See Austin Sarat, The "New Abolitionism" and the Possibilities of Legislative
Action: The New Hampshire Experience, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 343, 343 (2002); Austin Sarat,
Recapturing the Spirit of Furman: The American Bar Association and the New Abolitionist
Politics, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5-6 (1998).
76. See Steven D. Smith, Believing Like a Lawyer, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1041, 1098-136
(1999).
77. See HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF
THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES passim (1993); Richard W. Garnett,
Christian Witness, Moral Anthropology, and the Death Penalty, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 541, 543 (2003); Austin Sarat, Bearing Witness and Writing History
in the Struggle Against Capital Punishment, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 451, 455 (1996);
Austin Sarat, Between (The Presence of) Violence and (The Possibility of) Justice:
Lawyering Against Capital Punishment, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 317-46 (Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold eds., 1998).
78. See Jonathan Simon, Sanctioning Government: Explaining America's Severity
Revolution, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 217, 237-38 (2001); Benjamin D. Steiner et. al, Folk
Knowledge as Legal Action: Death Penalty Judgments and the Tenet of Early Release in a
Culture of Mistrust and Punitiveness, 33 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 461, 464-66 (1999).
79. See Jonathan Simon, From a Tight Place: Crime, Punishment, and American
Liberalism, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 853, 871-72 (1999) (reviewing SUSAN ESTRICH,
GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER: HOW POLITICS IS DESTROYING THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM (1998)); Jonathan Simon, Introduction: Crime, Community, and
Criminal Justice, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1415, 1417 (2002).
80. See Weisberg, supra note 1, at 1415; see also Kent Greenawalt, Religious
Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REV. 352, 363 (1985) (examining the
implications for community morality when an immoral act is treated as legal); Jennifer L.
Weiers & Marc R. Shapiro, The Innocence Protection Act: A Revised Proposal for Capital
Punishment Reform, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 615, 618 (2002-2003) (discussing
the effects of DNA testing of suspects on community safety).
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of criminal justice killing. Both civil and criminal justice traditions in
American law and lawyering82  draw upon religious faith.
Unsurprisingly, faith-based movements stand deeply entwined with
the death penalty, alternately joining and departing the ranks of
abolitionists.83 The movements and their underlying norms signal a
great diversity of theological stances on the morality of that penalty.84
Discrete and sometimes irreconcilable narratives emanate from each
of these stances. All of these narratives possess authority8 5 and
command logic.86 And all distill norms into stories 7 that guide the
moral imagination of the tripartite parties to capital cases. Enthralled
by the ordinary and extraordinary elements of morally compelling
story,88 the main parties to law-sanctioned ritualized death (offenders,
81. See MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 814-
39 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., 2002); MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES 9-24 (1997); H. JEFFERSON POWELL,
THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: A THEOLOGICAL
INTERPRETATION 48-81 (1993).
82. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS 39-40 (1987); THOMAS
L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT 107-09
(1981); Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyers and the Biblical Prophets, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 521, 521 (2003); Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyers as Prophets, 15 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 469, 469 (2003). Compare John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic
Judges in Capital Cases, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 350 (1998) (reasoning that judges should
not and cannot work to match the morality of the legal system), with Sanford Levinson,
The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39
DEPAUL L. REV. 1047, 1048-49 (1990) (discussing confirmation hearings of Catholic
nominees for the United States Supreme Court).
83. See GARDNER C. HANKS, AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY: CHRISTIAN AND
SECULAR ARGUMENTS AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 52-58 (1997); JAMES J.
MEGIVERN, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN HISTORICAL AND THEOLOGICAL SURVEY 457-
61 (1997); Michael L. Radelet, The Role of Organized Religions in Changing Death
Penalty Debates, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 201, 207, 211-13 (2000).
84. See generally Bruce S. Ledewitz & Scott Staples, Reflections on the Talmudic and
American Death Penalty, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 33 (1993) (discussing the
procedures and restrictions for capital punishment in ancient Israel as set forth in the
Talmud); Samuel J. Levine, Capital Punishment in Jewish Law and Its Application to the
American Legal System: A Conceptual Overview, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1037 (1998)
(analyzing capital punishment in Jewish law as it relates to the death penalty under
American law); William A. Schabas, Islam and the Death Penalty, 9 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 223 (2000) (suggesting that Islamic states, in recognizing the death penalty, do not
appreciate the more limited role of capital punishment under Islamic religion).
85. See ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW 419-39 (1993); Kathryn
Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 981-82 (1991).
86. Narrative logic both provokes and silences resistance. See Jane B. Baron,
Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255, 255-57 (1994).
87. See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 113-15,
121-22, 135 (2000); JEROME BRUNER, MAKING STORIES: LAW, LITERATURE, LIFE 5-6,
15-16 (2002).
88. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 87, at 51-53.
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victims, and juries), their legal agents (prosecutors, defenders, and
judges), and their state representatives (governmental executives,
legislators, and executioners) combine disparate norms, metaphors,
and stories in driving the machinery of capital punishment and
clemency.
Like all stories, criminal justice stories embrace the use of
metaphor.89  Indeed, their authority and logic depend on
metaphorical reasoning.9" Predictably, the pain of private violence
and the death of state killing resist the easy application of metaphor.
To be sure, it is easy to talk of innocence and guilt. To the same
extent, it is easy to talk of punishment and of the harsh simplicity of
retribution. However, it is difficult to talk of redemption. Narratives
of redemption are agonizing. They recall the agony of pain inflicted
on the other-as-victim and the anguish of the accused in accounting
for that pain. In this way, death penalty narratives mix cries of
pathology and violence not only with wails of forgiveness and mercy,
but also with punitive howls of retribution.
The first among the core dilemmas of clemency advocacy stems
from this moral cacophony. Confronted by the sounds of
lawbreaking and penal violence, it is difficult to hear of guilt
pronounced by offender voices of contrition and remorse. Similarly,
it is difficult to speak of forgiveness warranted by offender acts of
penitence and atonement. In sum, it is both necessary and
paradoxical, and perhaps futile, to beg for redemptive mercy from
retributive agents and institutions of violence, notwithstanding the
variable facts and trials of individual killings.
A second dilemma of clemency advocacy emerges from the
procedural and ethical regulation of religious imagery and narratives
inside and outside the courtroom.9' Abolitionists have long urged
89. See Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime Metaphors, 67 BROOK. L. REV.
1035, 1037-42 (2002). See generally LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN
THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (collecting perspectives on the role of
narrative in litigation and judicial opinions); NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE:
A READER IN STORYTELLING AND THE LAW (David Ray Papke ed., 1991) (anthology
discussing alternative legal narratives in advocacy and adjudication).
90. See STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND
12-14 (2001).
91. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chambers, 630 A.2d 630, 644 (Pa. 1991), cert denied,
522 U.S. 827 (1997) (adopting a per se exclusionary rule for references to religious texts
during the capital punishment sentencing phase); Elizabeth A. Brooks, Note, Thou Shalt
Not Quote the Bible: Determining the Propriety of Attorney Use of Religious Philosophy
and Themes in Oral Arguments, 33 GA. L. REV. 1113, 119-36 (1999) (discussing judicial
responses to religiously themed oral arguments); Marcus S. Henson, Casenote, Carruthers
v. State: Thou Shalt Not Make Direct Religious References in Closing Argument, 52
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courts and bar associations to proscribe or at least narrow the use of
religious narrative and symbolism in pretrial and trial proceedings.92
The record of prosecutorial misconduct in capital cases is replete with
prejudice-inducing invocations of religion and religious iconography
in pretrial comments, opening statements, closing arguments, and
post-trial remarks. Insofar as such invocations tilt the adversary
process toward death, they warrant prohibition. Although the logical
corollary of this ban also operates to forbid faith-inspired redemptive
advocacy, symmetry may go too far. Because offenders possess
unequal resources and standing relative to the state and its
prosecutorial agents, equality norms in fact may require the
differential treatment of offender and prosecutorial appeals to moral
theologies of redemption and retribution. Absent this distinctive
treatment, the dominance of retributive discourse directs clemency
advocates to espouse faith-based claims of redemption as widely and
forcefully as courts may permit.
A third dilemma of clemency advocacy arises from the
constitutional injunction to enunciate colorblind narratives and to
uphold race-neutral tactics at pretrial, trial, and post-conviction
proceedings. The breadth and vigor of this injunction are crucial
given the profound racial coloring of capital defendants and death
row offenders. Rather than rehearse the familiar objections to this
constitutional bar, cognition, practicality, and intuition collectively
recommend rejection of the colorblind charge in capital cases. Put
simply, death is not colorblind. Like the race of victims, the race of
offenders, jurors, and judges bears relevance to death penalty
procedures and outcomes. That relevance explains the prosecutorial
impulse and practice of employing color-coded and color-conscious
narratives in jury selection, opening statements, and closing
arguments. Clemency advocates ignore the racial character of crime
and criminal justice at their own peril and at the risk of squandering
MERCER L. REV. 731, 731-44 (2001) (describing standards used by the Georgia Supreme
Court to determine when prosecutorial religious references constituted reversible error);
see also DAVID E. GUINN, FAITH ON TRIAL: COMMUNITIES OF FAITH, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, AND THE THEORY OF DEEP DIVERSITY 9-10, 126 (2002) (asserting that
religious argument prevents public discussion).
92. See MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 3.1 (meritorious claims and
contentions), 3.4 (fairness to opposing party and counsel), 3.6 (trial publicity), 3.8 (special
responsibilities of a prosecutor) (2002); STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standards 3-1.4 (public statements), 3-5.2 (courtroom
professionalism), 3-5.3 (selection of jurors), 3-5.4 (relations with jury), 3-5.5 (opening
statement), 3-5.6 (presentation of evidence), 3-5.7 (examination of witnesses), 3-5.8
(argument to the jury), 3-5.9 (facts outside the record), 3-5.10 (comments by prosecutor
after verdict), 3-6.1 (role in sentencing) (1991).
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an important opportunity to engage the civic community in a moral
dialogue over the place of race in redemption.
The dilemmas of moral discourse, religious narrative, and race-
consciousness encumber clemency advocates with recurrent burdens.
Discharging those burdens dictates the development of strategies to
reintegrate mercy into the moral paradigm of retribution. Like
morality, law holds the jurisgenerative promise of constructive
opposition.93 That promise must be seized to affirm alternative
visions of moral community embodied in redemption. Seizure occurs
through the reconstruction of trial narratives94 material to both race 95
and death.96 Part of the process of reconstruction involves contesting
the narrative necessity of public retribution97 and fostering empathy98
93. See NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER
95-172, 203-38 (Martha Minow, Michael Ryan & Austin Sarat eds., 1995); Anthony V.
Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1721, 1748 (1994) (reviewing AUSTIN SARAT & THOMAS R. KEARNS, LAW'S VIOLENCE
(1992).
94. See Phillip H. Miller, Storytelling: A Technique for Juror Persuasion, 26 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 489, 489-90 (2003); Martha Merrill Umphrey, The Dialogics of Legal
Meaning: Spectacular Trials, the Unwritten Law, and Narratives of Criminal
Responsibility, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 393, 393 (1999); Martha Merrill Umphrey, Fragile
Performances: The Dialogics of Judgment in A Theory of the Trial, 28 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 527, 530 (2003).
95. See JON-CHRISTIAN SUGGS, WHISPERED CONSOLATIONS: LAW AND
NARRATIVE IN AFRICAN AMERICAN LIFE 19-42 (2000). See generally Chester L. Britt,
Race, Religion, and Support for the Death Penalty: A Research Note, 15 JUST. Q. 175
(1998) (studying the effect of race and religion on an individual's view of capital
punishment); Robert L. Young, Religious Orientation, Race and Support for the Death
Penalty, 31 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION 76 (1992) (studying the role of religious orientation in
shaping attitudes toward capital punishment).
96. See generally Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Dead Man Talking: Competing Narratives and
Effective Representation in Capital Cases, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 421 (1999) (explaining that
the need to humanize the defendant in a capital case requires that the defense lawyer
offer, and that the judge facilitate, the "Human Story" behind the defendant); Christopher
J. Meade, Note, Reading Death Sentences: The Narrative Construction of Capital
Punishment, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 732 (1996) (arguing that death penalty opposition must
create narratives that go beyond innocence stories and instead persuade people that even
the guilty should not be executed).
97. See Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in
a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV. 39, 81-82 (1994).
98. See generally Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 361 (1996) (discussing the capabilities and limitations of storytelling to
trigger empathy); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law:
New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099 (1989) (analyzing the role of emotion
and narratives in law and concluding that narratives and emotions, such as victim impact
statements, are not always helpful or appropriate); Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk,
40 UCLA L. REV. 1411 (1993) (discussing the dilemmas, drawbacks, and persuasive
power of victim rhetoric).
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in reaching out to heal the private pain of victims and their families.99
Evidence of this strained form of dialogue may be found in extant
jury deliberations and public debates, both endless and
irreconcilable. 100 Of necessity, the dialogue must draw guidance and
substance from the norms of remorse and atonement. 10' Regrettably,
that dialogue must unfold in an environment of fear where truth is
put at risk.1°2
CONCLUSION
This Essay took as its focal point the dilemmas of mercy lawyers
in representing prisoners and death row inmates in post-conviction
clemency proceedings. Often seen as deplorable, that representation
works to mediate the moral tension between retribution and
redemption. The tension erupts at the outset of capital trials in the
competition between innocence phase acquittal and penalty phase
mitigation strategies. It reoccurs at post-conviction clemency
hearings in the discordance of admitted guilt and asserted atonement.
The moral and strategic dilemmas spawned by this inherent tension
constitute byproducts of a system of state violence and an adversary
criminal justice process equally saturated by race and error.
By turns celebrated and condemned, the actions of former
Illinois Governor George Ryan in pardoning and commuting the
sentences of 167 prisoners and death row inmates in January 2003
offer no formula for resolving the confounding dilemmas of clemency
lawyers. Traditional and alternative models of criminal defense
advocacy provide nothing more than failed effort and vague direction
to lawyers 1°3 and inmates1" in the post-Illinois era of clemency
99. See Kristen F. Grunewald & Priya Nath, Defense-Based Victim Outreach:
Restorative Justice in Capital Cases, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 315, 332-33 (2003).
100. See Harold G. Grasmick et al., Religion, Punitive Justice, and Support for the
Death Penalty, 10 JUST. Q. 289, 289 (1993). See generally Brian Galle, Free Exercise Rights
of Capital Jurors, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 569 (2001) (arguing that excluding jurors based on
their death penalty views may conflict with the Free Exercise Clause).
101. See Stephen P. Garvey, Restorative Justice, Punishment and Atonement, 2003
UTAH L. REV. 303, 311-17 (2003). See generally Theodore Eisenberg et al., But Was He
Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599 (1998)
(discussing jurors' reactions to defendants and their crimes in terms of remorse and how
those reactions affect sentencing).
102. See generally John H. Blume et al., Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases:
Always "At Issue," 86 CORNELL L. REV. 397 (2001) (arguing that future dangerousness of
a defendant is on the minds of most capital jurors).
103. See Molly McDonough, Spared From Death: Blanket Commutations Leave
Lawyers Scrambling, 2 No. 2 ABA J. E-REPORT 2 (2003), at http://www.abanet.org/
journal/ereport/jl7clemency.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
104. See Robert Goodrich, Two Former Death Row Inmates Reflect on Ryan's Decision
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appeals. I have argued elsewhere that defenders and prosecutors may
play a transformative role in larger abolitionist and redemptive
movements.105 The normative prescriptions of Garvey, Sarat, Simon,
and Weisberg confirm that tempered role. Observing the growing
authority and violence of the penal state,"° they decline fully to
endorse a faith-inspired abolitionist model of clemency advocacy for
mercy lawyers. Their reluctance, however, overlooks the rising
historical moment of theological integration increasingly pervading
legal theory and education.1 7 Unless abolitionists grasp this moment
of transformation, the dilemmas of the secular lawyer in pleading
redemptive norms to the retributive state, in citing the sacred to the
profane, will remain insoluble.0 8
to Commute Sentences: Appeals Had Run Out for One, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan.
24, 2003, at Al; Lee Hockstader, Off Ill. Death Row, to a Rougher Place: Inmates'
Isolation Also Meant Safety, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2003, at A3; Jodi Wilgoren, Leaving
Death Row is Blessing and Curse for Prisoner in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,2003, at A14;
Eric Zorn, Tragic Case Cried Out for Ryan's Mercy, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 23, 2003, at 1N.
105. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, (Er)Race-ing an Ethic of Justice, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 935 (1999) (putting William Simon's The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers'
Ethics to work "in the service of fashioning an ethic of representation in race cases");
Anthony V. Alfieri, Mitigation, Mercy, and Delay: The Moral Politics of Death Penalty
Abolitionists, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325 (1996) ("offering a preliminary reflection
on the politics of abolitionist lawyering"); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race-ing Legal Ethics, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 800 (1996) (arguing that the convergence of race, law, and language in
criminal defense advocacy warrants a fuller ethical defense of racialized strategies within
the ambit of zealous advocacy).
106. See Stephen B. Bright, Lecture, The Electric Chair and the Chain Gang: Choices
and Challenges for America's Future, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 845, 847 (1996).
107. See William J. Stuntz, Christian Legal Theory, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1711
(2003) (reviewing CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL THOUGHT (Robert F. Cochran et
al. eds., 2001); see also Panel Discussion, Does Professionalism Leave Room for Religious
Commitment?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 875 (1999) (examining the place of religion in
present-day lawyering). See generally Panel Discussion, Models of Successful "Religion
and Lawyering" Programs, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 917 (1999) (identifying several
programs that provide for the combination of religion and lawyering).
108. See generally Thomas L. Shaffer, Nuclear Weapons, Lethal Injection, and
American Catholics: Faith Confronting American Civil Religion, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 7 (2000) (examining the "collision that should occur between faith
and American civil religion").
